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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE np UT'AH
Plaintiff/Appe1Iee,

Case No. 981398-CA
Priority No. 1 5

WENDELL MAVANICK,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
Should the Court's written opinion be amended to reflect the
fact that Appellant

did JI it concede the validity of the arrest

warrant leading to the contested search of his peiscwi wli^i^
Appellant specifically argued against the validity of the warrant
and did not

in the trial coui t,

deviate from this position curing oral argument Joercre Unit"
Cour\ V
RELIEF REQUESTED
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to amend it's
opinion to corre:.,

: L ••

•

•• •

.-he did not concede the

validity of the arrest warrant underlying the arrest and
contested search in this matter.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THIS COURT SHOULD AMEND ITS OPINION TO CORRECTLY
REFLECT THE FACT THAT APPELLANT DOES NOT CONCEDE THE
VALIDITY OF THE ARREST WARRANT UNDERLYING THE SEARCH
THAT HE CHALLENGED ON APPEAL.
Pursuant

n

i n

',» i w

J iin> ntriti Rules of Appellate

Procedure (199.9 », 3 rehearing is merited in Lliis Uourt wh^tn-

Llie

court has overlooked or misapprehended" the law or facts of a
case in issuing a decision.

A rehearing is merited in the

present case because the Court "overlooked or misapprehended" the
fact that Appellant Wendell Navanick ("Navanick") did not concede
the validity of the arrest warrant that led to his arrest and the
subsequent search contested on appeal.

Id.

After full briefing and oral argument concerning the
legality of the jailhouse search of Navanick, this Court issued
an opinion (for official publication) affirming the lower court's
denial of Navanick's motion to suppress evidence seized incident
to that search in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

See State v. Navanick 1999 UT

App. 265 (September 23, 1999) (included in Addendum A ) .

In that

opinion, the Court stated, " [b]ecause it is conceded that the
officers in this case were acting pursuant to a valid arrest
warrant, the only issue before this court is whether the police
acted reasonably under the circumstances in arresting defendant."
Id. at 3.
In writing the Navanick opinion, the Court "overlooked" the
fact that Navanick has not

conceded the warrant's validity at any

point in the criminal proceeding against him.
35(a).

Utah R. App. P.

First, Navanick asserted in the trial court that the

warrant did not meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to the extent that "[the warrant] didn't truly name him
or particularly describe him in that it had a different spelling
of the name [and] had [a] different birthdate."
2

Record for

Appeal ("R.") at 290 [89] ; see also Addendum B (relevant text of
suppression hearing).
Again in his opening brief ("A.B."), footnote 5, Navanick
challenged the validity of the warrant without equivocation.

See

A.B.10-11 n.5; see also Addendum C (text of footnote 5 from
Appellant's Opening Brief).

Navanick wrote in his brief: "The

trial court found that the [arrest] warrant was valid.
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity."
n.5.

R.137.

A.B.10-11

He then discussed at length how the warrant fails to meet

the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment under
applicable case law.

Id.

Navanick restated the challenge to the

validity of the arrest warrant in his reply brief ("R.B.").

See

R.B.I (answering state's preservation challenge regarding his
argument about the invalid arrest warrant); see also Addendum D
(relevant text of Appellant's Reply Brief).
Navanick did not deviate from his stance regarding the
invalid warrant during oral argument, held August 19, 1999,
either.

In the interests of time, Navanick did not discuss the

invalidity of the warrant during his opening, choosing instead to
use his allotted time to address why the officers did not act
reasonably under the circumstances in arresting Navanick.

See

Tape No. 526 (Side B) (audio recording of oral argument).

This,

however, does not amount to a concession that the warrant was
valid.

Indeed, even the State recognized that Navanick continued

to contest the validity of the warrant to the extent that it
acknowledged his argument in his opening brief, then proceeded to
3

argue points to the contrary in support of the validity.

Id.

Given the repeated challenges to the validity of the arrest
warrant, and the fact that Navanick did not deviate from this
position during oral argument, this case merits a rehearing where
the Court "overlooked or misapprehended," Utah R. App. P. 35(a),
this fact in writing its opinion, stating instead that the
validity of the warrant was "conceded."

Navanick, 1999 UT App.

265 at 3.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Navanick respectfully requests
this Court to amend its opinion to reflect the fact that he does
not concede the validity of the arrest warrant leading to his
arrest and the subsequent search challenged on appeal.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition
is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Respectfully submitted this

lit
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COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981398-CA
F I L E D
(September 23, 1999)

Wendell Navanick,
Defendant and Appellant.

1999 UT App 265

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
Attorneys:

Ralph Dellapiana and Catherine E. Lilly, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
111 Defendant Wendell Navanick appeals from his conviction for
possession of a controlled substance, claiming the trial court
erred in denying his motion to exclude methamphetamine seized
during a jailhouse search. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12
On July 3, 1997, Officer Bryan Bailey received a call from
the manager of Motel 6 on 600 South Street in Salt Lake City,
Utah. The hotel manager reported she suspected a guest at the
motel registered under the name of Wendell Navanick was engaged
in "pimping." After learning an arrest warrant had been issued
for Wendell Navanick, Officer Bailey contacted Officer Mitchell,
told him about the phone call from the motel manager, and
instructed him to go to Motel 6 to execute the arrest warrant.
13
Officer Mitchell contacted dispatch and was informed that
Wendell Navanick, birth date 11-21-71, had an outstanding arrest
warrant for phone harassment issued from West Valley City.
Officer Mitchell also checked the Salt Lake City Police
Department's records, which included Wendell Navanick with a

Lc*<^

ikiUi

birth date of 11-27-71 and an alias birth date of 1-7-71. The
records indicated that both birth dates were associated with the
same address. The records, however, did not include a physical
description of Wendell Navanick, and Officer Mitchell did not
call the West Valley City Police Department to obtain a physical
description of the arrestee.
1[4
Officer Mitchell, Detective Hatch, and Officer Ewell then
went to Motel 6 and knocked on the door of the room registered to
Wendell Navanick. When the door opened, Detective Hatch
recognized the man inside as Wendell Navanick because of a prior
contact. Mitchell then asked defendant for his name and birth
date. Defendant said he was Wendell Navanick and that his birth
date was 1-7-71. Mitchell then told defendant there was a
warrant for his arrest for phone harassment. Although defendant
seemed confused and told the officers that he was not the same
Wendell Navanick as the one listed on the warrant,1 Officer
Mitchell did not believe him and took defendant into custody.2
K5
At the Salt Lake City Jail, the jailer found methamphetamine
on defendant during a routine booking search. While Mitchell was
entering the charge of possession of a controlled substance into
the computer, the jailer told Mitchell that he knew of two
Wendell Navanicks and that defendant might not be the one listed
on the warrant.3
16
At trial, defendant moved to suppress the methamphetamine
found during the search on the basis that the search violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because it was predicated upon an invalid
arrest. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant
subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, and
received a one year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail and
three years probation.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f7
Defendant argues the trial court erred in concluding his
arrest was valid and in denying his motion to suppress the
methamphetamine seized during the booking search. "In reviewing
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we will

1.

Defendant's legal name is John Gutierrez.

2.

The only basis for the arrest of defendant was the warrant.

3.
The State does not dispute defendant's assertion that there
are at least two persons named Wendell Navanick in the Salt Lake
City area and that the arrest warrant was issued for the other
Wendell Navanick.

981398-CA
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not overturn the trial court's factual findings absent clear
error." State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citing State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct- App. 1991).
The trial court's legal conclusions, however, we review for
correctness. See id.
ANALYSIS
18
Defendant argues the arresting officers violated his Fourth
Amendment4 rights by failing to verify whether defendant was the
person listed on the warrant before arresting him. The State
counters that the officers acted reasonably under the
circumstances in arresting defendant.
1|9
When a person is mistakenly arrested pursuant to a valid
arrest warrant, the arrest and subsequent seizure of evidence is
valid only if: (1) probable cause existed for the arrest;5 and
(2) the police reasonably, and in good faith, believe the suspect
is the intended arrestee. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797.,
802, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 1109 (1971). Because it is conceded that
the officers in this case were acting pursuant to a valid arrest
warrant, the only issue before this court is whether the police
acted reasonably under the circumstances in arresting defendant.
See Gero v. Hanault, 740 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st Cir. 1984) (!f [W] here
there is a facially valid warrant or probable cause for arrest,
. . . the only question is whether it was reasonable for the
arresting officers to believe that the person arrested was the
one sought."). Although Hill and its progeny provide guidance on
the question of whether officers acted reasonably in arresting
defendant, "whether a police officer reasonably believes an
arrested and a sought individual to be the same often entails a
highly factual inquiry." Brown v. Patterson, No. 85 C 6859, 1986
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20961, at *12 (N.D. 111. Aug. 29, 1986).
Furthermore, "the reasonableness of the officers1 belief must be
determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
arrest." Id. at *3.
1l0 In Hill, the Supreme Court held that the mistaken arrest of
a person other than the person sought under the warrant was
reasonable because the person arrested was found at the address
on the warrant and matched a description of the arrestee. See
Hill. 401 U.S. at 803, 91 S. Ct. at 1110. Other courts following

4.
Defendant's arguments on appeal are limited to the Federal
Constitution.
5.
At oral argument, defendant abandoned his claim asserted in
his brief that a misspelling of the name on the arrest warrant
rendered it invalid. We therefore do not address this claim.

981398-CA
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Hill have held that a mistaken arrest is reasonable when it is
based on other information separately justifying the arrest.
See, e.g., State v. Green, 723 A.2d 1012, 1013 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (holding arrest of wrong person justified where
description of intended arrestee matched appearance of man
arrested); Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373, 375, 379 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding arrest of man whose identification and
description matched that of intended arrestee valid). In this
case, defendant maintained when he was arrested that he was not
the person listed on the warrant. Protestations of mistaken
identity and innocence are common during an arrest, however, and
such assertions do not necessarily obligate an arresting officer
to verify the suspect's identity before making an arrest. See
Hill, 401 U.S. at 802-03, 91 S. Ct. at 1110 (noting aliases and
false identifications are not uncommon); cf. Haynes v. Chicago,
No. 95 C 7205, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5294, at *10 (N.D. 111.
April 17, 1996) (dismissing section 1983 claim and stating in
case of mistaken identity, "arresting officer is not obligated
. . . to 'investigate independently every claim of innocence,'
including mistaken identity.") (citation omitted).
Ull Courts have held mistaken arrests valid when police
reasonably believed the suspect was the intended arrestee. For
example, in Sanders, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia addressed the validity of an arrest where police
approached a suspect who, when asked for identification,
"produced an identification card on which his last name was
misspelled as Saunders (rather than Sanders) ." Sanders, 339 A.2d
at 375. The officer then discovered an outstanding warrant for
the arrest of Robert Saunders whose description matched the
defendant. See id. When the arresting officer asked the
defendant if he had ever been incarcerated in Arlington County,
Virginia, where the arrest warrant was issued, defendant
responded that he had. See id. Police then arrested and
searched the defendant, finding illegal weapons and ammunition.
See id. Officers later discovered the warrant was issued for the
arrest of someone other than defendant. See id.
Kl2 Defendant moved to suppress the weapons and ammunition,
arguing the evidence was obtained pursuant to an invalid arrest.
Relying on Hill, the appellate court noted:
Should doubt as to the correct identity of
the subject of warrant arise, the arresting
officer obviously should make immediate
reasonable efforts to confirm or deny the
applicability of the warrant to the detained
individual. If, after such reasonable
efforts, the officer reasonably and in good
faith believes that the suspect is the one
against whom the warrant is outstanding, a

981398-CA
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[search] pursuant to the arrest of that
person is not in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 379. Because the police had no reason to believe that
defendant was anyone other than the arrestee listed on the
warrant, the court held n , on the record before us the officers'
mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response
to the situation facing them at the time.1" Id. (quoting Hill,
401 U.S. at 804, 91 S. Ct. at 1111). "The evidence seized
incident to the arrest properly was admitted into evidence." Id.
Hl3 Similarly, in Green, the New Jersey Superior Court addressed
the issue of whether the mistaken arrest of a man whose
appearance was "dramatically similar" to that of the person
sought under the warrant was valid. Green, 723 A.2d at 1013.
The court held that because the defendant was found at the house
listed on the warrant and resembled the description of the
arrestee, "the arresting officer had a reasonable belief" he
was arresting the correct person. Id.
1l4 The circumstances of the arrest in this case lead us to
conclude that the officers acted reasonably in arresting
defendant. The unchallenged findings of fact, upon which the
trial court based its denial of defendant's motion to suppress
support this conclusion. These findings include the following:
4. On July 3, 1997, while on duty, Salt Lake
City Police Detective Bryan Bailey received a
telephone call from the manager of a Motel 6
in Salt Lake City reporting suspicious
activity in room 148.
5. The manager told the police that a
"Wendell Navanick" was registered in room
148.

7. Detective Mitchell called police dispatch
by telephone and asked them to check the name
"Wendell Navanick" for warrants.
8. The dispatcher informed Detective
Mitchell that there was a warrant for a
person with that name and the date of birth
of 11/27/71.
9. An arrest warrant for "Wendall Navanick"
with an address of "1985 South 200 East, SLC,
UT 84115," date of birth "11/27/71," on a

981398-CA
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charge of telephone harassment was signed byJudge Judith Atherton, Third District Court,
West Valley Department, on May 7, 1997.

11. No physical description was provided on
the warrant.
12. Detective Mitchell checked the police
department's computerized records and
determined that there were two dates of birth
associated with the name Wendell Navanick,
11/27/71, and an alias date of 1/7/71.

15. The man inside [room 148] was identified
as the defendant, Wendell Navanick.
16. An officer accompanying Detective
Mitchell recognized the man in room 148 as
Wendell Navanick.
17. Defendant told Detective Mitchell that
his date of birth was 1/7/71, which was
consistent with the information that
Detective Mitchell had obtained from police
records.
18 . Defendant was informed of the warrant
and denied that he was the person named in
the warrant.
19.

Defendant's testimony was not credible.

20. Defendant had no identification to show
to the police.
21. Although "Wendell Navanick" is an
uncommon name, at least two persons by that
name, including the defendant, have been
booked into the Salt Lake County jail.
22 . Defendant had used names other than
Wendell Navanick in the past.
23. Detective Mitchell stated that suspects
often gave him false names and dates of
birth.

981398-CA
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Ul5 The officers in this case had a reasonable basis to believe
they were arresting the correct person. Furthermore, the trial
court's findings — to which we defer--support its denial of
defendant's motion to suppress. We therefore conclude that,
under the circumstances, the officers acted reasonably in
arresting defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his conviction for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
CONCLUSION
1l6 When police mistakenly arrest a suspect pursuant to an
arrest warrant for a different person, the arrest and subsequent
search is valid only if: (1) the officers have probable cause to
arrest the suspect; and (2) the officers, in good faith,
reasonably believe the person they arrest is the person sought
under the warrant. In this case, the police were acting pursuant
to a valid arrest warrant for telephone harassment supported by
probable cause. Furthermore, officers acted reasonably in
arresting defendant when the motel manager informed officers that
Wendell Navanick was registered in room 148, one of the arresting
officers recognized defendant as Wendell Navanick, defendant had
no identification and gave information consistent with that
listed on the warrant, Wendell Navanick is an uncommon name,
defendant's testimony was not credible, and because suspects
often give police officers false information in an attempt to
avoid arrest. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in
denying defendant's motion to suppress and affirm his conviction
for possession of a controlled substance.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

H17

WE CONCUR

n
Kfudith-- Mv*Billings, Judge

^£w

981398-CA
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regularly for hearing before the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley, a Judge of the Third District Court
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on
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1

motion hearing, it was essentially undisputed

that he

2

is not the person named in the warrant.

3

warrantless arrest.

4

warrant.

5

evidence to that effect.

6

type of a case and shouldn't have, in view, come this

7

far at all.

8

How does it apply at all?

9

this warrant, I mean other than the obvious and

This was a

Certainly he wasn't booked on a

At least, I think we have presented
And so it is the

This is a warrant.

simplest

What of the warrant?

It is our position

that

10

undisputed fact that it wasn't for this defendant,

11

which I think is dispositive, it didn't truly name

12

him or particularly describe him in that it had a

13

different spelling of the name, had different

14

birthdate.

15

a different birthdate, but then what is the

16

Let me address this.

17

that the statutory standard of 77-7-11 applies

18

an officer can make an arrest.

19

position is that this is a constitutional

20

Perhaps that provision of the statute would

21

the officer against a tort claim for false arrest.

22

It doesn't change the constitutional standard.

I

23

cannot.

case

24

where the legislature tried to legislately impose a

25

good faith exception to the warrant requirement

Mr. Navanick testified he has never

It is the State's

given

standard.

position
that

I think that our
issue.
protect

I am reminded of the State vs. Mendoza

in

ADDENDUM C

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE

WENDELL NAVANICK,

Case No. 981398-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
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ZSiA

satisfied.

The question then becomes "whether it was

reasonable

for the arresting officers to believe that the person arrested
was the one sought."

Gero v. Henault, 74 0 F.2d 78, 84-85 (1st

Cir. 1984) (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) .5 As explained by the
5

The trial court found that the warrant was valid. R.137.
Navanick, however, does not concede its validity. A valid warrant
under the Fourth Amendment must particularly describe the person to
be arrested.
See West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78, 14 S. Ct. 752, 38
L.Ed. 643 (1894).
Whether a warrant meets the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment "depends upon the particular
circumstances" of each case. State v. Mclntire, 768 P. 2d 970, 972
(Utah App. 1989) (discussing particularity requirements for search
warrants) (citing State v. Anderson, 701 P. 2d 1099, 1102 (Utah
1985)) . Generally, a warrant that correctly names the arrestee is
adequate. See Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir.
1981) . However, a warrant that incorrectly names the subject is
not valid unless accompanying affidavits provide additional
information that clarifies his or her identity. Id.
In the present case, the warrant did not correctly name the
arrestee to the extent that it misspelled the name as "Wendall
Navanick;" the correct spelling is "Wendell." R.191. Moreover,
the warrant was not accompanied by any information, such as an
affidavit, that could cure the deficit in information identifying
the subject of the warrant.
Id.
Although the warrant itself
provided a birth date and address, as discussed herein, neither
piece of information conformed to other information obtained by the
officer (i.e. - Mitchell was sent to a different address than the
one listed on the warrant, R.290[9,13,15] , and the birth date was
contradicted by another one indicated in a record referenced by
Mitchell, R.290 [16-18]) . Accordingly, under the circumstances, the
warrant did not adequately describe the arrestee with sufficient
particularity to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
As noted in Sanders v. United States, 339 A.2d 373 (D.C. App.
1975), where, as in the present case,
an agent of the state makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant
(assuming no independent probable cause), and the warrant
fails, the arrest also must fail, for the agent's authority to
make a proper arrest dies with the warrant. Good faith or
reasonableness on the part of the arresting officer cannot
remedy such an infirmity.
Id. at 377 (citing Hill, 401 U.S. at 804) . The arrest at issue
here fails since the warrant is invalid and Mitchell, as he himself
admitted, did not have probable cause to arrest Navanick that
existed independently of the warrant.
R.290 [30].
Furthermore,
even assuming Mitchell exercised good faith in executing this
10
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officers acted reasonably when they arrested a p e r s o n m i s t a k e n
f o r p e t i t i o n e r H i l l a n d seized evidence in a search incident to

arrest, such w o u l d n o t b e enough for the arrest to survive the
Fourth A m e n d m e n t ' s prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure; M i t c h e l l ' s "authority to make a proper arrest die[d] w i t h
the warrant." S a n d e r s , 33 9 A.2d at 3 77
In addition t o the foregoing, another aspect of this case
undermines the v a l i d i t y of Navanick's arrest. In U n i t e d States v.
Leon, 468 U.S 89 7, 104 S. Ct : 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the
Supreme Court established the good faith e x c e p t i o n to the
exclusionary rule, upholding the admissibility of e v i d e n c e seized
as a result of an officer's reasonable reliance u p o n a search
warrant that later turned out to be invalid. 4 6 8 U . S . at 925-26.
In so holding, however, the Court expressly noted that the
exception w o u l d n o t apply where a "warrant [is] so facially
deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the p l a c e [or person]
to be searched o r the things to be seized - that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Id. at 9 2 3 .
The hypothetical scenario envisioned b y t h e L e o n Court is the
reality in the present case. Under the circumstances here a n d for
reasons discussed a b o v e , t h e information provided in t h e w a r r a n t is
"facially d e f i c i e n t " in that it fails to "particularize" t h e p e r s o n
to b e arrested. Id. H e n c e , Mitchell could not "reasonably presume
it to b e valid."
In acting on an obviously deficient w a r r a n t ,
Mitchell
d i d not exercise good
faith, a n d therefore the
exclusionary rule applies to this case. Id. at 925-26.
Yet, even assuming the validity of the warrant
and/or
Mitchell's good faith reliance thereon, the arrest is still illegal
under the Fourth Amendment given the u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the
m i s t a k e n arrest of Navanick. See discussion infra.
6

"Totality of the circumstances" includes assessment of such
factors as the "adequacy of the description of the suspect, time
and place of arrest, and [the arresting officer's] action in the
period immediately following the arrest", United States v. Valez,
796 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1986), and the particular exigencies of the
s i t uat ion.
See, e.g. , United States v. Marshall, 7 9 F . 3 d 68, 6 9
(3d Cir. 1996).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WENDELL NAVANICK,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981398-CA
Priority No. 2

:
ARGUMENT

ISSUE: NAVANICK PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS ARGUMENT FOR APPEAL
AND HIS ARGUMENTS HAVE RECORD SUPPORT.
The State contends that Appellant Wendell Navanick
("Navanick") did not preserve his arguments on appeal in two
respects.

See State's Brief ("S.B.") at n.6, n.8. First, the

State asserts that Navanick's discussion of the facial validity
of the warrant was not preserved to the extent that the exact
points he challenges on appeal were not articulated to the trial
court below.

S.B. n.5. The State is incorrect.

In his opening brief, Navanick asserts that the warrant does
not meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment
on the basis that the subject's name was misspelled and that the
birth date and address listed on the warrant were different or
contradicted by other information possessed by Officer Mitchell.
See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at n.6. These same grounds were
articulated by defense counsel to the trial court when he stated:
11

[the warrant] didn't truly name him or particularly describe him

in that it had a different spelling of the name [and] had [a]
different birthdate."

R.290[89].

Hence, contrary to the State's

assertion, the issue was adequately preserved for appeal.

